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1Abstract
We describe the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive
industry with free entry and exit. The exogenous wage rate deter-
mines the ﬁrms’ engagement in labor productivity enhancing process
innovation. There is a unique steady state of the industry dynam-
ics, which is globally asymptotically stable. In the steady state, the
number of active ﬁrms, their unit labor cost and supply depend on
the growth rate but not on the level of the wage rate. In addition to
providing comparative statics of the steady state, the paper character-
izes the industry’s adjustment path. Journal of Economic Literature
Classiﬁcation Numbers: D24, D41, D92, J30
Key words: process innovation, industry dynamics, wages.
21 Introduction
How do wages aﬀect the incentives for labor productivity enhancing innova-
tion at the ﬁrm and the industry level? We address this question by studying
the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive industry in which the
last period’s best technology is freely available to all competitors. Firms in
this industry face an exogenous wage rate, which can be thought of as being
determined in the aggregate labor market of the underlying economy. This
wage aﬀects the innovative performance of the industry as ﬁrms seek to cap-
ture inframarginal rents by increasing labor productivity. The dynamics of
innovation converge to a unique steady state, in which unit labor costs are
constant over time. In the steady state, the number of active ﬁrms, their
supply and unit labor cost turn out not to depend on the level of wages;
they only depend on their rate of growth. From any initial conﬁguration
the industry characteristics monotonically approach the steady state as time
evolves. Along the adjustment path, high but declining productivity growth
rates are associated with entry of new ﬁrms and a decline in the size of ﬁrms.
Exit induces an increase in market concentration when productivity growth
is relatively low but increasing over time.
Technological innovations as a means to reduce labor costs seem to have
been at the heart of economic growth for many decades. The conventional
macroeconomic view is that productivity growth drives wage growth. In
a competitive equilibrium, the wage rate equals the marginal productivity
of labor. Therefore, traditional growth theory has a causality running from
productivity growth to wage growth. This view, however, presumes that pro-
ductivity growth is exogenous and independent of labor market conditions.
In contrast, in our analysis productivity growth is endogenously determined
by innovation incentives at the ﬁrm and industry level. Firms respond to
high and growing wages by productivity enhancing innovations to substi-
tute against labor. Our model thus points to a microeconomic causality
that runs in the opposite direction to the traditional macroeconomic view.1
It shows how wage growth, which may reﬂect technological progress at the
economy-wide level, stimulates productivity enhancing innovations at the in-
dustry level. Of course, the implication of our partial equilibrium analysis
for macroeconomic modelling is that both, wage growth and productivity
growth, are jointly endogenously determined (see Hellwig and Irmen [15]).
Our theoretical argument is in the same spirit as the empirical ﬁndings
of Gordon [10] who argues that a substantial component of accelerations and
1A similar causality is emphasized in eﬃciency wage models, where higher wages raise
productivity because of adverse selection or incentive eﬀects, see e. g. Yellen [30].
3decelerations of productivity growth in Europe, Japan and the U.S. can be
attributed to the behavior of the ratio of wages to labor productivity (see
also Gordon [11]). A number of microeconometric studies have established
a positive relationship between wages and the introduction of new technolo-
gies. The time series results of Doms, Dunne and Troske [6] suggest that
plants with high wage workforces are more likely to adopt new technologies.
A possible explanation for this could be some complementarity between tech-
nology and skill: Wages are positively related to workforce skills and these
skills allow new technologies to be adopted at lower costs. The alternative ra-
tionalization, which we model in this paper, is that higher wages will induce
ﬁrms to substitute away from labor through new technologies. Chennells and
Van Reenen [3] conclude from their analysis of British plant data that this
substitution eﬀect may indeed be an important factor. In a dynamic factor
demand model, Mohnen et. al. [25] ﬁnd that the long–run cross–price elas-
ticity of R&D with respect to the price of labor is fairly large. Also Flaig and
Stadler [9] conclude from their estimation of a dynamic model of innovation
behavior that the wage rate seems to be a major determinant for process
innovations.
The partial equilibrium dynamics of a competitive industry have been
studied ﬁrst by Lucas and Prescott [24]. Since then, a number of models has
been developed that focus on innovation under technological uncertainty in
a competitive industry. These models investigate the stochastic evolution of
ﬁrms and entry and exit over the product life cycle.2 Our study focuses on
the relation between wages and labor productivity. For simplicity, it disre-
gards ex ante ﬁrm heterogeneity. Since the last period’s best technology is
freely available to all potential competitors, entry and exit never occur si-
multaneously along the adjustment path as the industry variables approach
their steady state values. Also, the basic model in Sections 2 – 4 abstracts
from stochastic factors that may aﬀect innovation. This, however, is not
restrictive since, as we show in Section 5, uncertainty does not qualitatively
alter our results. An interesting feature of our model is that innovation does
not rely on monopoly or oligopoly rents. It thus provides a counterexample
to the Schumpeterian view that such rents are necessary to support R&D in-
vestments. In our model, ﬁrms have strictly convex production technologies,
which generate inframarginal rents. As in Petrakis and Roy [26], these rents
induce proﬁt maximizing entrepreneurs to spend resources on innovation.
Our model emphasizes the dynamic nature of the innovation process.
2See, e.g., Dixit [5], Hopenhayn [16], [17], [18], Jovanovic [19], Jovanovic and Mac-
Donald [20], Klepper [21], Lach and Rob [22], Lambson [23], and Ericson and Pakes [7].
Ericson and Pakes [8] address this question in an imperfectly competitive industry.
4Current innovations upgrade the technological knowledge that has been ac-
quired through past innovations. They render old technologies obsolete and
unproﬁtable. Innovators beneﬁt from the past R&D eﬀorts of their rivals.
Also, they aﬀect the incentives for future innovations. These features re-
semble several building blocks in some recent models of endogenous growth
(e.g., Aghion and Howitt [1], Grossman and Helpman [13]). The endogenous
growth literature typically treats all industries as symmetric; it does not cap-
ture the mechanism that induces diﬀerent sectors to adjust to economy wide
technological progress. Our model addresses this issue by oﬀering a partial
equilibrium perspective of the mechanisms underlying the endogenous growth
literature. It focuses on the determinants of technical change in an indus-
try that may thought of as being imbedded in an economy in which overall
technological progress induces wages to increase over time. In this way, our
analysis may complement the aggregate models of the endogenous growth
literature. It provides a feedback mechanism between aggregate factor pro-
ductivity growth and innovation activities at the industry level. Indeed, as
Hellwig and Irmen [15] have shown recently, our model can be used as a
starting point for a general equilibrium model, which simultaneously deter-
mines the aggregate rate of technical change and the innovation behavior of
individual ﬁrms.
Our model predicts that the impact of labor market conditions on pro-
ductivity may be important for understanding the innovative performance of
diﬀerent industries and countries. Our analysis emphasizes the role of higher
wages in creating substitution away from labor that boosts productivity in
a small sector embedded in an economy where the aggregate market for la-
bor is competitive and individual ﬁrms take wages at the industry level as
exogenously given. In contrast, other studies have been concerned with the
impact of unions on wages and innovation. Here the conventional wisdom
follows Grout’s [14] argument that the union will appropriate some share of
the rents from technological improvements. This tends to reduce the ﬁrm’s
incentive to innovate.3 Yet, our main insights do not necessarily rely on the
competitive labor market paradigm. Our analysis shows that not the level of
wages but their growth rate is important for long–run productivity growth.
Therefore, the possible presence of industry wage diﬀerentials does not aﬀect
our results as long as the time path of the industry’s wage follows the same
trend as the competitive wage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
3A short outline of the rent-sharing argument together with an empirical analysis can be
found in Van Reenen [29]. Ulph and Ulph [28] present a model with diﬀerent conclusions.
5stylized model of a competitive industry. Section 3 describes its short–run
equilibrium. The main results are contained in Section 4, which studies the
industry’s long–run behavior. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses the role of uncer-
tainty in the innovation process. The ﬁnal Section oﬀers concluding remarks.
The proofs of the formal results in Sections 3 and 4 are relegated to an Ap-
pendix.
2 The Model
The model depicts the evolution of a competitive industry with free entry and
exit. The ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good and take the market clearing
price as ﬁxed. Similarly, they behave competitively in the labor market by
considering the wage rate as exogenous. Time is discrete and at each date
there is a suﬃciently large number of potential producers who have access
to the current technology. Producers become active at date t by investing in
capacity and engaging in process innovation to increase labor productivity.
At date t+1 they employ labor to produce output. Given the intertemporal
path of wages, the evolution of the industry is determined by the active ﬁrms’
innovation behavior because this generates the technology at the next date,
which is available to all ﬁrms. In the basic model the innovation process is
deterministic; the analysis is extended to stochastic innovation outcomes in
Section 5.
Formally, the model is speciﬁed as follows. At date t a ﬁrm invests in
production capacity xt and at date t + 1 it hires labor nt+1. Depending on
its labor productivity at+1 in period t + 1, its output yt+1 is given by the
Leontief production function
yt+1 = min[xt,at+1 nt+1]. (1)
Obviously it is optimal to set nt+1 = xt/at+1 and so the ﬁrm’s output is equal
to xt. At date t + 1 the competitive wage rate is wt+1 and the ﬁrm sells its
output at the price pt+1. Therefore, its operating proﬁt is
R(xt,pt+1,ct+1) ≡ [pt+1 − ct+1]xt, (2)
where ct+1 ≡ wt+1/at+1 denotes the ﬁrm’s unit labor cost.
At date t, each potential producer observes the process innovations per-
formed by the active ﬁrms. As Klepper [21], we assume that after one period
he can costlessly incorporate these innovations into his own technology. Thus
current R&D generates an intertemporal spillover eﬀect on the starting point
6of future innovative and productive activity. Still, an active ﬁrm has a one-
period monopoly over the technological improvements generated by its R&D
activity in period t. We focus on labor productivity enhancing process inno-
vation and assume that each ﬁrm can increase current productivity by the
factor (1 + q) by investing the amount K(q). Thus, if at describes the most
advanced technology developed at date t − 1, a ﬁrm’s labor productivity at
t + 1 becomes
at+1 = (1 + qt)at
by investing at date t the amount K(qt) in process innovation.
The exogenous wage rate wt grows at the rate γ > 0 so that wt+1 =
(1 + γ)wt, with w0 > 0. One possible interpretation is that γ represents the
average growth rate of labor productivity in the entire economy. Therefore,
also wages grow at the rate γ in the equilibrium of the economy–wide labor
market. Since the industry under consideration constitutes only a small part
of the whole economy, its impact on the equilibrium wage rate can be taken to
be negligible.4 Given the growth of wages, after investing K(qt) in innovation





Finally, to install the capacity x, a ﬁrm has to invest the amount C(x)+f,
i.e. there is a ﬁxed cost f > 0 and a variable capacity cost C(x). Therefore,
a ﬁrm that commits to the investment K(qt) + C(xt) + f in capacity and
innovation, expects to have the proﬁt






− K(qt) − C(xt) − f. (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the common discount factor.
We denote the total mass of active ﬁrms at date t by nt. In each period, the
industry faces the (inverse) demand function P(·) so that P(¯ x) is the market
clearing price for the aggregate supply ¯ x. The assumption that demand is
stationary over time is not essential for our analysis. We discuss this issue
below in Section 4.
We maintain the following assumptions on inverse demand P(·), innova-
tion costs K(·) and capacity costs C(·):
4 As we indicated in the Introduction, the industry’s wage rate wt does not have to be
identical to the competitive wage rate. If ωt represents the competitive wage rate, then
our analysis remains valid as long as there is an α > 0 such that wt = αωt.
7Assumption 1: P(0) = ¯ p > 0, P 0 < 0, P(∞) = 0 and







Assumption 2: K(0) = 0,K0(0) = 0,K0(q) > 0,K00(q) > 0 for all q > 0,






Assumption 3: C(0) = 0,C0(0) = 0,C0(x) > 0,C00(x) > 0 for all x > 0,





Condition (5) in Assumption 1 guarantees that demand is suﬃciently high
so that some producers are active whenever the wage rate is small enough.
Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that the cost functions are suﬃciently convex
to avoid problems with nonconvexities, which typically arise in R&D models
(see, e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz [4]). It is easy to see that Assumption 2
requires that the elasticity of the marginal innovation cost K0(q) is at least
twice the elasticity of the cost K(q). Similarly, the last part of Assumption
3 is identical to assuming that the elasticity of the diﬀerence between the
marginal cost, C0(x), and the average cost, C(x)/x, is at least one. Assump-
tions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed for instance for K(q) = κqα and C(x) = χxβ as
long as α ≥ 2 and β ≥ 2.
3 Static Equilibrium
First, we consider the industry equilibrium at a particular date t. At this
date, the wage rate wt together with the labor productivity at determine
the current wage-productivity ratio ct. This parameter describes the state of
the industry at date t. Of course, ct depends on the evolution of wages and
productivity in the past. Yet, in this Section we focus on the static aspects




t|ct) is a static equilibrium if
(i) (q∗
t,x∗
t) maximizes Π(q,x|pt+1,ct) if n∗
t > 0; and q∗
t = x∗




t|pt+1,ct) = 0 if n∗
t > 0; and Π(q,x|pt+1,ct) ≤ 0 for all (q,x) if
n∗
t = 0;
(iii) pt+1 = P(n∗
tx∗
t).
At date t, a total mass of n∗
t ﬁrms enters the market to produce some
output at t+1. Since all ﬁrms are identical, they choose the same output x∗
t
and innovation rate q∗
t. The ﬁrst equilibrium requirement is that the ﬁrms
behave competitively by taking the market price pt+1 as ﬁxed when choosing
x∗
t and q∗
t so as to maximize proﬁt. With free entry, proﬁts cannot be positive.
Condition (ii) states that each ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt when the mass of active
ﬁrms is positive. Otherwise, proﬁts may be negative. Finally, as total output
at date t+1 is n∗
tx∗
t, the third equilibrium condition ensures that the market
clears at the price pt+1.




Moreover, there is a ¯ c > 0 such that n∗
t > 0 if and only if ct < ¯ c.
Proposition 1 establishes a unique static equilibrium for each wage–pro-
ductivity ratio. If the wage rate is too high or the productivity of labor too
low, then no ﬁrm enters the market because – even at the eﬃcient scale – aver-
age costs exceed the chock-oﬀ price P(0). If, however, the wage-productivity
ratio is low enough, condition (5) ensures that a positive measure of ﬁrms op-
erates in the market. Firms choose their R&D expenditures such that their
marginal beneﬁt from the higher labor productivity tomorrow equals their
marginal cost of innovation. Further, as ﬁrms are price takers, they choose
the output level such that their marginal cost equals the market price. In ad-
dition, free entry in the industry implies that the ﬁrms’ average cost is equal
to the market price, and hence to their marginal cost. As a consequence, it is
as if each ﬁrm were minimizing its average costs in equilibrium. Given that
a ﬁrm’s average cost is strictly convex in output and R&D expenditures,
there is a unique output and innovation level that minimizes these costs for
each wage-productivity ratio; moreover, the minimum average cost, and thus
the market price, is unique. Finally, the number of ﬁrms adjusts such that
demand equals supply. As demand is strictly decreasing, the number of ﬁrms
is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let (q∗
t,x∗
t,n∗
t|ct) be a static equilibrium. When ct < ¯ c, the
rate of productivity growth q∗
t increases with the wage-productivity ratio ct.
9Higher labor costs per unit of output create a stronger incentive to sub-
stitute away from labor through productivity enhancing innovation. This
is simply so because ﬁrms choose their R&D expenditures to equate the
marginal beneﬁt from the increase in labor productivity to the marginal cost
of innovation. As the marginal beneﬁt of innovation is proportional to the
current wage-productivity ratio, the ﬁrm’s optimal R&D expenditures are
higher when the current wage is higher, or the current labor productivity is
lower.5
Proposition 3 Let (q∗
t,x∗
t,n∗
t|ct) be a static equilibrium. When ct < ¯ c, each
ﬁrm’s output xt increases with ct. The total mass of active ﬁrms n∗
t and
aggregate industry output n∗
tx∗
t strictly decrease with ct.
The rate of innovation and the level of output are complements for a
proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. Intuitively, the total gain from a given reduction in
unit labor costs increases with the quantity of goods produced. As we know
already from Proposition 2, the higher the wage-productivity ratio, the higher
is the ﬁrm’s innovation rate. Accordingly, also output is positively related
to the wage-productivity ratio. In other words, an increase in the unit labor
cost raises the minimum eﬃciency scale, at which ﬁrms operate in a free
entry equilibrium. Furthermore, since the minimum average cost is higher
when a ﬁrm faces higher wages or its labor productivity is lower, the market
clears at a higher price and total demand is reduced. Since bigger ﬁrms serve
a smaller total demand, the number of active ﬁrms in the market is smaller
when the wage-productivity ratio is higher.
Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that innovative investments are higher in
a smaller, more concentrated market.6 Yet, this observation does not im-
ply a causal relationship since innovation, ﬁrm size and industry size are
simultaneously determined. Another implication of Proposition 3 is that, as
the wage-productivity ratio increases, aggregate employment in the industry
decreases because industry output shrinks. As a result, higher productivity
growth and lower aggregate employment are observed in the industry.7 Note
however that, as the size of ﬁrms increases, employment at the ﬁrm level
may increase or decrease with the wage-productivity ratio. There is no clear
relationship between productivity growth and employment at the plant level.
5See the ﬁrst order conditions (16) in the Appendix.
6For our model, it would seem natural to regard 1/nt as a measure of the degree of
concentration.
7This observation is in line with the model of Bean and Pissarides [2] where an upward
shift in the wage-setting schedule raises both equilibrium unemployment and productivity
growth.
104 Equilibrium Dynamics
We now turn to the industry dynamics which are determined by the ﬁrms’
innovation decisions. At each date, free entry implies zero proﬁts. Therefore,
in period t each ﬁrm can ignore the impact of its innovation decision on the
industry’s state variable ct+1 at the subsequent date. In the previous Section
it was shown how ct aﬀects the industry equilibrium in period t. As part
of this equilibrium, the rate of productivity growth q∗
t is a function of ct.
Since q∗
t determines the change in the state variable from period t to t + 1,
the industry’s dynamics are generated by the evolution of ct. The industry
starts in period t = 0 from the exogenously given labor productivity ¯ a0. Since
the wage rate in this period is w0, the initial value of the state variable is
c0 ≡ ¯ c0 = w0/¯ a0. We consider the parameter ¯ c0 as exogenous and assume that




















t, with c0 = ¯ c0, (8)
It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that for any ¯ c0 the equilibrium
path of the industry is fully determined. We are especially interested in the
long–run behavior of the industry. Therefore, we look at the equilibrium out-
come for large values of the time index t and investigate whether eventually
the market will become stationary. The industry will be in a steady state if
the number of active ﬁrms, their output and their innovation eﬀorts remain
constant over time.
Deﬁnition (ˆ q, ˆ x, ˆ n|ˆ c) is a steady state if it is a static equilibrium and ˆ q = γ.
In a steady state, the state variable remains at the value ˆ c because wages
and labor productivity grow at the same rate. As a result, also the number of
active ﬁrms and their output do not change over time. Notice that, if there
is a steady state, it is independent of the initial value ¯ c0 of the state variable.
Instead the steady state endogenously determines the wage–productivity ra-
tio ˆ c. Also, the deﬁnition of a steady state implicitly presumes that ˆ n > 0.
This follows immediately from the static equilibrium condition (i) and γ > 0.
Proposition 4 There is a ¯ γ > 0 such that a steady state (ˆ q, ˆ x, ˆ n|ˆ c) exists if
and only if γ < ¯ γ. Moreover, if there is a steady state, it is unique.
11A steady state equilibrium is feasible only if the growth rate of wages is
low enough so that the industry can aﬀord to match it with labor saving
innovations. If this is not the case, the evolution of productivity will lag be-
hind the growth of wages and so average costs increase over time. Ultimately,
this will drive the industry towards extinction as we show in Proposition 8
below. We will ﬁrst deal with the more interesting case where γ < ¯ γ. The
following result shows that in this situation the time path of the industry will
eventually approach the steady state, independently of the initial conditions.
Proposition 5 If there is a steady state, it is globally asymptotically stable.





to (ˆ q, ˆ x, ˆ n|ˆ c) in the limit as t → ∞.
Over time, productivity growth converges to the rate of wage growth.
Thus, the steady increase in real wages determines the ﬁrms’ persistent en-
gagement in labor productivity enhancing innovations. Another important
implication of the above result is that the long–run behavior of the industry
is independent of its initial productivity ¯ a0 and the level of the wage rate w0.
As time evolves, the industry’s innovative eﬀorts adjust labor productivity in
such a way that it becomes proportional to the wage rate by the factor 1/ˆ c.
The basic intuition for this phenomenon is derived in Proposition 2. The in-
centives for innovation are positively related to the wage-productivity ratio.
This ratio reaches its steady state level when productivity and wages grow at
the same rate. Above this level it induces productivity to grow faster than
wages. The opposite happens when unit costs are below the steady state
value. As a result, the endogenous pace of technical progress always moves
the wage-productivity ratio towards the steady state.
In the long-run, the initial state of the industry becomes irrelevant not
only for ct but also for qt,xt and nt. These variables tend towards their steady
state values, which are independent of ¯ a0 and w0. The level of wages, however,
has a profound impact on the employment of labor . As ˆ c is a constant, a
one percent increase in the level of wages raises also the long–run level of
labor productivity by one percent. At the same time, the level of wages
does not aﬀect total industry output in the steady state. As an implication,
employment falls by one percent. In other words, the long–run elasticity of
employment with respect to the wage level equals minus unity.
In the long–run, it is not the level of wages but the growth rate of wages
which determines the industry’s unit labor cost. As the following Proposition
shows, the latter is positively related to the growth rate of wages.
12Proposition 6 In the steady state (ˆ q, ˆ x, ˆ n|ˆ c) the wage–productivity ratio ˆ c
increases with γ.
Again, the intuition for this observation comes from Proposition 2. A
higher rate of productivity growth can be supported only when higher unit
labor costs force the ﬁrms to speed up innovation. In combination with
Proposition 3, this implies that the steady state size of ﬁrms increases with
γ. As a result of an increase in γ, a smaller number of ﬁrms operates in the
industry producing a lower level of aggregate output.
We ﬁnally characterize the dynamic path of the industry.















































t+1 if ¯ c0 > ˆ c.
The industry monotonically approaches the steady state equilibrium. De-
pending on the initial state, the adjustment process exhibits either accel-
erations or decelerations of productivity growth. Changes in productivity
growth are positively related with changes in ﬁrm size. Exit occurs in combi-
nation with relatively low but increasing rates of productivity growth. Along
this path, the industry adjusts to a higher level of unit labor costs; total
production and aggregate employment decrease while the output price in-
creases. In contrast, when the industry approaches a lower level of unit labor
costs, the industry’s production increases and so the output price declines
over time. This process is supported by the entry of new ﬁrms, which exploit
the knowledge-spillover externality created by the old ﬁrms.
The literature on industrial dynamics associates a ‘shakeout’ in the num-
ber of producers with the maturity phase in the industry’s product life cycle.
As an empirical regularity of this phase (see, e.g., Gort and Klepper [12] and
Klepper [21]), the number of producers steadily declines while their output
increases. Also, the ﬁrms’ eﬀorts to improve the production process increase
over time. Proposition 7 reﬂects these regularities when ¯ c0 < ˆ c. This param-
eter constellation might apply to an industry in which previous technological
breakthroughs have lead to a high productivity level. Once the industry
matures, the process of innovation becomes more predictable and is driven
mainly by continuous technological improvements.
13Given the initial state ¯ c0, exit occurs when wages grow relatively fast.
Indeed, as we indicated above, the industry will not be able to reach a steady
state when γ exceeds the critical level ¯ γ. In this situation, the exit process
eventually eliminates the entire industry.




t)t be an equilibrium sequence. If γ > ¯ γ, then
there is a ﬁnite T > 0 such that n∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ T.
It is worth noting that in our model the demand function P(·) has no
eﬀect on how qt, xt and ct are determined along the industry’s equilibrium
path. Indeed, proﬁt maximization in combination with the assumption of
free entry implies that, for a given ct, each individual ﬁrm operates at the
minimum of its average cost, which uniquely determines its choice of qt and xt.
Therefore, these variables and the evolution of ct are determined solely by the
ﬁrms’ cost structure and the growth rate of wages and are thus independent
of demand.
Demand, however, does aﬀect the number nt of active ﬁrms. While the
individual ﬁrm’s technology is strictly convex, at the level of the industry
constant returns are guaranteed by the assumption that the current tech-
nology can be replicated by those ﬁrms that decide to become active. In
equilibrium, the price pt equals the minimum of the individual ﬁrm’s aver-
age cost and the number nt of active ﬁrms adjusts to equate demand and
supply. For example, an upward shift in the demand function P(·) results
in an increase of nt along the equilibrium path but leaves all other variables
unaﬀected.
As a consequence, stationarity of demand is not essential for our analysis.
Implicitly, stationarity presumes that the growth of wages and income in the
economy does not aﬀect industry demand. This could be justiﬁed by assum-
ing that demand is derived from quasi-linear utility functions. If, however,
demand does change over time, our analysis can easily be modiﬁed to take
this into account. For instance, when demand grows at the rate ρ, then in
the steady state also the number of active ﬁrms grows at the rate ρ. But, ρ
does not inﬂuence ˆ q, ˆ x and ˆ c. Employment either increases or decreases over
time depending on ρ being larger or smaller than γ.
5 Uncertain Innovations
To simplify the exposition of our key argument, we have so far modeled
productivity enhancing innovations as a completely deterministic process.
14By spending K(qt) in productivity enhancing innovations at date t, a ﬁrm
increases its labor productivity from at at date t to at+1 = at(1 + qt) at
date t + 1. However, as investment in innovation often entails stochastic
elements, it may be worthwhile to examine the robustness of our analysis
by considering uncertainty in the investment outcome. The simplest way to
address this issue is to assume that if an individual ﬁrm invests K(qt) at date
t, with probability r its labor productivity increases to at+1 = at(1 + qt) at
date t + 1 and with probability 1 − r remains the same so that at+1 = at,
where 0 < r < 1 is the ﬁrm–speciﬁc probability of success. As previously,
each potential producer can costlessly incorporate the best available practice
into his own technology at the next date. Observe that, since there is a
continuum of ﬁrms in the industry, the probability that at least one of them
succeeds in enhancing its labor productivity equals one. Therefore, all active
and potential producers start out with the labor productivity at(1 + qt) at
date t + 1.
Interestingly, the introduction of uncertainty does not qualitatively alter
our main ﬁndings. To see this, note that the present value of expected proﬁts






− (1 − r)ct(1 + γ)
#
xt (9)
− K(qt) − C(xt) − f.
In comparison with (4), uncertainty shifts the individual ﬁrm’s (expected)
average cost curve upwards and lowers the marginal beneﬁt of the innovation
eﬀort.8 Therefore, in the unique static competitive equilibrium with n∗
t > 0
and a given ct, the ﬁrm’s innovation rate and output level are now lower,
the expected average cost and thus the product price are higher, and the
aggregate production level is lower. (Note that, the number of active ﬁrms,
however, can be higher or lower.) Moreover, n∗
t > 0 if and only if ct < c(r) <
c, with ∂c/∂r > 0, i.e. there is a positive number of active producers in
the industry only for wage–productivity ratios that are lower than an upper–
bound c(r) which is smaller than under certainty and which decreases as the
probability of success becomes smaller.
Turning to the equilibrium dynamics, there exists a unique steady state
where the (industry) labor productivity growth rate equals again the exoge-
nous growth rate in wages γ if and only if γ < γ(r) < γ, with ∂γ/∂r > 0.
That is, the upper bound is lower under uncertainty and decreases as the
8Note that, a decrease in the probability of success r has the same impact on the
marginal beneﬁt of the investment as a decrease in the individual ﬁrm’s discount factor δ.
15probability of success becomes smaller. Hence, the industry becomes extinct
even for growth rates of wages where it could survive under deterministic
innovations. Otherwise, the industry converges monotonically towards the
steady state where the (industry) innovation rate equals γ. In the steady
state, each active ﬁrm invests K(γ) in labor productivity enhancing pro-
cesses at date t and obtains positive proﬁts at date t + 1 if it succeeds in
innovating and negative proﬁts in case of failure, with its expected proﬁts at
date t being equal to zero. Finally, the wage-productivity ratio in the steady
state is higher than under certainty, i.e. b c(r) > b c and, moreover, increases as
r becomes smaller, i.e. ∂b c/∂r < 0. Intuitively, the ﬁrms will invest less for
each given wage-productivity ratio, because their incentives to invest in labor
saving innovations are weaker under uncertainty. As a result, the industry
will now match the rate of wage growth only if the wage-productivity ratio
is higher than with deterministic innovations.
6 Concluding Remarks
Technical progress and a substantial increase in real wages are main at-
tributes of the growth process in the advanced industrial nations. Our anal-
ysis presents a cost-push argument of productivity growth. The basic idea
is that proﬁt seeking, competitive ﬁrms adjust their innovative activity to
increasing labor costs. Higher labor costs create stronger incentives for pro-
cess innovations that raise the productivity of labor. The more interesting
issue, however, is the dynamic interaction between innovation and produc-
tivity. As current innovations aim at reducing the ﬁrms’ labor cost, they also
aﬀect their future incentives for inventive activities. Our analysis shows that
long–run productivity growth at the industry level is driven by the growth
rate of wages. This rate determines the number of active ﬁrms, their labor
costs per unit of output, the size of ﬁrms and the industry’s output in the
long–run. While these variables are independent of the level of the wage rate,
the latter determines the level of labor productivity and employment within
the industry. These results are derived in a basic model with a deterministic
innovation process. Yet, it is shown that this model can easily be extended
and that uncertainty does not qualitatively change the results.
The industry’s adjustment path exhibits either entry or exit of ﬁrms. In
contrast with a number of recent studies on industry dynamics, we abstract
from stochastic factors that induce ﬁrm heterogeneity. Yet, this abstraction is
mainly motivated by simplicity. In principle, our model could be enriched by
ﬁrm–speciﬁc technological shocks so that entry and exit occur simultaneously.
16Another interesting extension of our model is the consideration of im-
perfect competition. A Cournot or Bertrand framework could address the
question of how strategic interactions between the ﬁrms aﬀect productivity
growth in the short–run and in the long–run. Stimulated by the work of
Schumpeter [27], a large part of the literature on R&D relates the pace of
innovative activity to market structure. An imperfect competition version of
our model could combine this approach with our cost-push argument. Also, it
would allow studying the impact of unionization on innovation. Rent sharing
is likely to depress the short–run incentives for innovation. Yet, our results
lead to the conjecture that unionization will not inﬂuence long–run produc-
tivity growth, unless wage bargaining aﬀects not only the level but also the
growth rate of industry wages.
7 Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 – 8. These proofs are






K(q) + C(x) + f
x
. (10)
Lemma 1 Let (qt,xt,nt|ct) be a static equilibrium. If nt > 0, then (qt,xt)
minimizes ϕ(q,x|ct). Moreover, δpt+1 = ϕ(qt,xt|ct).
Proof. By equilibrium condition (ii), δpt+1 = ϕ(qt,xt|ct). Suppose there
exists (q0,x0) such that ϕ(q0,x0|ct) < ϕ(qt,xt|ct). Then Π(q0,x0|pt+1,ct) > 0 =
Π(qt,xt|pt+1,ct). This yields a contradiction to condition (i). Q.E.D.




(1 + q)3 +
K00(q)
x







C00(x)x2 + 2C(x) − 2C0(x)x






x4 ≥ 0. (13)
By the inequalities in (11) - (13), ϕ(q,x|c) is strictly convex. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Let (q(c),x(c)) minimize ϕ(q,x|c). Then q(·) and x(·) are con-
tinuous and strictly increasing in c. Moreover, q(c) → 0 as c → 0, q(c) → ∞
as c → ∞ and x(c) → ∞ as c → ∞.
Proof. By strict convexity of ϕ(·) the values (q(c),x(c)) are unique. The
assumptions on K(·) and C(·) ensure that q(c) > 0 and x(c) > 0. Since
ϕ(·) is continuous in (q,x,c) for all (q,x,c), the functions q(·) and x(·) are
continuous in c.
Let (q0,x0) = argmin ϕ(q,x|c0) and (q00,x00) = argmin ϕ(q,x|c00). Then
δc
0 1 + γ
1 + q0 +
K(q0) + C(x0) + f
x0 < δc
0 1 + γ
1 + q00 +
K(q00) + C(x00) + f
x00 , (14)
δc
00 1 + γ
1 + q00 +
K(q00) + C(x00) + f
x00 < δc
00 1 + γ
1 + q0 +
K(q0) + C(x0) + f
x0 .











Thus c0 < c00 implies that q00 > q0. This proves that q(·) is strictly increasing.
If ϕ(q,x|c) attains a minimum at (q,x), q and x must satisfy the ﬁrst order
conditions
δc(1 + γ)x = K
0(q)(1 + q)
2, C
0(x)x − C(x) = K(q) + f. (16)
The l.h.s. of the second equation is strictly increasing in x and the r.h.s. is
strictly increasing in q. Therefore, as q(·) is strictly increasing, also x(·) is
strictly increasing.
As x(·) is strictly increasing, the ﬁrst equation in (16) implies that q(c) →
0 as c → 0 and q(c) → ∞ as c → ∞. The second equation in (16) therefore
implies that also x(c) → ∞ as c → ∞. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Let (q(c),x(c)) minimize ϕ(q,x|c). Then there is a unique ˆ c such
that q(ˆ c) = γ. Moreover, q(c) < γ if c < ˆ c and q(c) > γ if c > ˆ c
18Proof. By Lemma 3, one has q(c) < γ for c suﬃciently small and q(c) > γ for
c suﬃciently large. Thus by continuity of q(·) there is a ˆ c such that q(ˆ c) = γ.
Uniqueness of ˆ c and the second statement follow from Lemma 3, as q(·) is
strictly increasing. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 Let (q(c),x(c)) minimize ϕ(q,x|c). Then c(1 + γ)/(1 + q(c)) is
increasing in c.






Thus we have z0(c) > 0 if
[K




0(q)(1 + q). (18)






Therefore (18) is equivalent to
[K





2(1 + q). (20)







0(x)x − 2C(x)] > K
0(q)(1 + q). (21)










As f > 0, (22) is certainly satisﬁed, which proves that z0(c) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (q∗
t,x∗
t) be the argmin of ϕ(qt,xt|ct) (see (10)).
By Lemma 2, (q∗
t,x∗
t) is unique since ϕ is strictly convex in (qt,xt). Deﬁne
pt+1 ≡ ϕ(q∗
t,x∗




t). As P(·) is strictly decreasing, the solution is unique with
n∗
t > 0. We now claim that (q∗
t,x∗
t,n∗
t) is the unique static equilibrium for
the wage-productivity ratio ct. As (q∗
t,x∗
t) minimizes the average cost ϕ(·|ct),
19it also maximizes a ﬁrm’s proﬁts for given pt+1 and thus condition (i) of the
deﬁnition of the static equilibrium is satisﬁed. Further, by deﬁnition of pt+1
a ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts (condition (ii)). Finally, by the deﬁnition of n∗
t,
the market clears (condition (iii)). Suppose next that pt+1 ≥ ¯ p. In this case,
n∗
tx∗





To prove the second part, note ﬁrst that ϕ(q∗
t,x∗
t|ct) is strictly increasing







t|ct) → ∞ as ct → ∞. Further, by (5), ϕ(q∗
t,x∗
t|0) < δ¯ p.
Thus, by continuity of ϕ(·), there exists a ¯ c such that ϕ(q∗
t,x∗
t|¯ c) = δ¯ p. By
the above argument, n∗
t > 0 if and only if ct < ¯ c. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The ﬁrst statement follows immediately from Lemma




t|ct). Since by the Envelope Theorem,
ϕ(q∗
t,x∗
t|ct) is strictly increasing in ct, this implies that n∗
tx∗
t decreases with
ct. As a consequence of the ﬁrst statement, also n∗
t decreases with ct. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since ˆ n > 0, Lemma 1 implies that ϕ(γ, ˆ x|ˆ c) ≤
ϕ(q,x|ˆ c) for all (q,x). By Lemma 4 there is a unique ˆ c such that this condition
is satisﬁed. By Proposition 1 there is thus a (unique) steady state if and only
if ˆ c < ¯ c. It follows from Lemma 3 that q(ˆ c) = γ and ˆ c < ¯ c if and only if γ
lies below some positive upper bound ¯ γ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Lemma 4, q∗
t < γ if c∗
t < ˆ c and q∗
t > γ if c∗
t > ˆ c.













t > ˆ c. (23)
Lemma 5 in combination with (8) shows that c∗
t+1 increases with c∗
t. This





t+1 < ˆ c if c
∗






t > ˆ c. (24)
This proves that the sequence (c∗
t)t converges. By (8), therefore, q∗
t → γ so
that c∗
t → ˆ c. By Proposition 1 and a simple continuity argument this implies
that the equilibrium sequence converges to the steady state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let γ0 < γ00 and let (γ0,x0,n0|c0) and (γ00,x00,n00|c00)
be the corresponding steady states. Suppose c0 ≥ c00. Then Proposition 2
implies that γ0 ≥ γ00, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. By the proof of Proposition 5, the equilibrium se-
quence satisﬁes (24). This in combination with Propositions 2 and 3 proves
the statement of the Proposition. Q.E.D.
20Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose n∗
T > 0 for all ﬁnite T. Then the proof of
Proposition 5 implies that c∗
t converges to some ˆ c. By Proposition 4, ˆ c > ¯ c.
By Proposition 1 this implies n∗
t = 0 for t suﬃciently large, a contradiction.
Since n∗
T = 0 implies 0 = q∗
t < γ, one has c∗
t > c∗
T for all t > T. Therefore
n∗
t = 0 for all t > T. Q.E.D.
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